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11. Introduction
Standard choices are of great - and arguably of growing - importance in modern
economies,1 yet to the best of my knowledge, almost no quantitative empirical
research exists on how and when standards are chosen.2 In many industries,
telecommunications being the paramount example, standards are a prerequisite for the
diffusion of a new technology and therefore also for the ensuing welfare gains. As
argued forcefully by Hausman (1997, 2002), regulatory delays can be extremely
costly in such situations. Whether the delay is due to regulatory wrangling on how to
implement a standard once a it has been nominally chosen (as was the case in the U.S.
regarding first generation mobile phones), or due to regulatory indecision as to what
standard to choose (as was the case in France, the UK and Germany, for example,
regarding the same decision),3 is of second order importance from a welfare point of
view. The delay between the first (or optimal) possible date of adoption, and the
actual implementation is what counts. Hausman estimates that delays in the
introduction of the 1st generation mobile phone standard lead to an annual welfare loss
in  the  order  of  tens  of  billions  of  dollars  in  the  U.S..4 It is therefore important to
understand what determines the timing of actual standard choice, and that is the
objective of this paper. Using an international dataset, I estimate the determinants of
timing for (more precisely, hazard rate of) standard adoption in 1st generation (1G)
1 For theoretical work, see Farrell and Saloner (1988), and Farrell (1996), who also discusses several
examples of delay. For surveys that discuss standard choice, see e.g. Katz and Shapiro (1994), Shapiro
and Varian (1999), and Gandal, (2002).
2 Indeed, a recent survey on the economics of technology policy (Mowery, 1997) does not mention
standardization issues at all. Simcoe (2003) is the only paper known to me that empirically analyzes
standard making decisions. His data comes from the Internet Engineering Task Force. For qualitative
analyses on mobile phone standards, see e.g. Funk and Methe (2001), Kano (2000), and on High-
Definition TV, Farrell and Shapiro (1992).
3 There is a third possible delay, that of the firm(s) being slow to build the network after been given
permission to go ahead. Given that in first generation mobile telephony firms were either government
owned monopolies or heavily regulated, this delay for all practical purposes is part of the first one.
2mobile phones – the very standard whose delay lead to huge estimated welfare losses
in the U.S..
Costs and benefits of adoption should naturally affect the timing of standard
choice. I link country demographics, data on worldwide mobile phone diffusion, and
data on telecommunications patenting onto data on standard choice to capture benefits
and costs. To study whether different political governance structures affect the timing
of standard choice after controlling for costs and benefits, I match these data to widely
used measures of political institutions (see e.g. Easterly and Levine, 1997, La Porta et
al., 1997, 1999, Djankov et al., 2002). These have been shown to systematically affect
other regulatory decisions, such as ease of entry; one would therefore expect them to
be informative as to how conducive a given country’s political institutions are to
fast/slow decision-making in standard choice.
I find that the political institutions of a country do indeed affect the timing of
1G standard adoption even after controlling for benefits  - geography, population, and
gdp per capita, and costs  - indirect network effects, and the country’s technological
level (human capital) in telecommunications. The hazard rate of standard adoption
increases more in response to having at least some telecoms human capital, the better
the political rights. Countries of French legal origin, which according to La Porta et al.
(1999) have inferior government performance, decrease their hazard rate in response
to an increase in telecoms human capital. I interpret this to reflect the effects of
lobbying by the domestic telecoms industry for its preferred standard. Such effects
have been documented in qualitative research to have resulted in a rather substantial
delay in many countries (e.g. France, UK, and Germany). I find that governments do
take indirect networks effects into account as predicted, increasing the hazard rate in
4 Gruber and Verboven’s (2001a,b) empirical work establishes another cost: Apparently, diffusion of
3response to increases in installed base, and decreasing it in response to increases in
future growth of the installed base. These effects are stronger, the better are political
rights.
The decision to look at 1G standard timing is based on the following features
of  that  decision:  i)  it  is  well-defined,  and  therefore  comparable  over  time  and  over
countries; ii) during the period I study, effectively all countries had a government
owned telecom monopoly and those that didn’t, such as the U.S., had heavy
government regulation. It is not always clear whether it is a government body (say,
the Ministry for Post and Telecommunications) or the telecom monopoly that chooses
the standard, but for my purposes this distinction is irrelevant: both can be viewed as
arms of the government; iii) unlike the 2nd and 3rd generation mobile phone standards,
1G was widely and rightly perceived to be a national decision, and qualitative
evidence exists that suggests that the decision was politicized in many countries.
Issues like international compatibility or roaming were generally not considered
important.5 This  also  means  that  any  international  network  effects  that  exist  are
indirect,  i.e.,  choosing  a  widely  spread  standard  may allow the  population  access  to
cheaper phones, and the telecom monopoly access to cheaper network equipment.
Therefore one can argue that the welfare optimizing decision would have been to
adopt some standard (several of which were technically ready to be implemented by
the mid to late 70’s) relatively early; and iv) there is variation in actual decisions
taken. U.S. and Japan were the first countries to adopt an analog (1G) standard in
1977 (Advanced Mobile Phone System, AMPS, in the US) and 1978 (Nippon
Telegraph and Telephone, NTT, in Japan). In the U.S., however, the services did not
mobile phones was slower initially in countries where a standard was chosen later. Whether this can be
attributed to other forms of regulatory inefficiencies is not clear.
5 A known exception to that are the Nordic countries who did take international roaming within the
area into account.
4start until 1983 (e.g. Hausman, 1997, pp. 17). Some advanced industrialized countries
reached a (different) decision many years later (e.g. France in 1985).6 Less developed
countries introduced standards even later.
There are three major potentially complicating factors in studying this
particular decision. First, mobile telephony is a network good (Katz and Shapiro,
1994). Second, technical progress during the observation period lead to the
introduction of new technologies after the observation period: in particular digital 2G.
Third, governments were potentially playing a game instead of making decisions in
isolation (see Gandal and Shy, 2001, for such a theoretical analysis).
As argued above, the network nature of the final good plays only a limited role
in the current analysis. As any user can testify, in most instances she does not care (to
a first degree) what standard the receiver is using, as long as a connection can be
established. The only network effects that might affect the current analysis are that
phones using one standard may not operate in areas where the network is built for
another standard; however, 1G phones were used nationally, and therefore this
problem does not surface as long as the networks are national. Naturally there are
exceptions to this rule, the U.S. and Brazil being examples of countries where
networks were regional or local rather than national. Indirect network effects from
economies of scale in production, and increased competition on the supply side are
taken into account in the analysis.
I deal with technical progress in two ways. First, I allow the baseline hazard to
change over time, thereby allowing technical change to affect the hazard rate
(conditional probability) of adoption. Second, I end the observation period in 1987 to
6 In the empirical analysis, I define the year of actual adoption as the year prior to the year in which
EMC registers the first users. The idea is that an irreversible decision is taken only at the point of
building the network. Thus in the data, the U.S. adoption date is coded as 1982, and that of France as
1984.
5avoid having 1G decisions being affected by the oncoming 2G. The first 2G networks
were established in 1991, and the European Union governments coordinated their 2G
decision on the GSM standard in the late 80’s.
As is clear from above, I model the standard choice as a government decision.
Unlike 2G and 3G, 1G decisions were (largely) uncoordinated between governments.
The main reason for that most likely is that the “mobile” phones of the late 70’s and
early 80’s were very unlike the ones in use today. They were heavy, had limited
battery life, lower quality of voice, and were mostly used from some base such as a
car. There was little expectation that they would change in nature to the extent that
they have over the last 20 years.7 I take the view that an individual government was
not affected by the decision of any other particular government, but only by the
aggregate choice(s) of all the other governments, i.e., that the interdependence
between governments is more alike monopolistic than oligopolistic competition.
Throughout the world, governments actively affect the way markets operate. A
larger literature exists (see e.g. Joskow and Rose, 1989, Laffont and Tirole, 1993) that
studies how to optimally regulate markets or individual firms. Though more
infrequent and the object of less research, governments’ effect on markets through
institutional choices is probably as pronounced. All these choices reflect the
objectives of a government. The ”new” political economy literature (Drazen, 1999,
Grossman and Helpman, 2001, and Persson and Tabellini, 2000, 2002) takes the view
that governments’ decisions, too, are affected by the institutional setting in which they
operate. In particular, the institutional setting determines by how much, and in what
direction, government decisions may deviate from welfare optimizing ones.
7 For example, Kano (2000) cites Financial Times, July 26, 1999, reporting that the ex-CEO of
Ericsson (one of the leading firms in 1G and 2G mobile phone technologies), Kurt Hällström, stated:
“When I joined Ericsson in 1984, Radio Communications was something odd happening on the
outskirts of Stockholm”.
6Earlier  papers that combine industrial organization questions with a political
economy approach and econometric analysis include several that study
telecommunications:8 Donald and Sappington (1995) analyze U.S. deregulation, Duso
(2001) the effects of political regime within U.S. states on the incidence and
effectiveness of regulation, Duso and Röller (2001) deregulation in OECD countries
using political economy variables, and Henisz and Zelner (2001) the effects of
political institutions on telecommunications infrastructure investment using data from
147 countries. Gruber and Verboven (2001a,b) and Liikanen, Stoneman and Toivanen
(2004) study the diffusion of mobile phones without controlling for political
institutions. To the best of my knowledge, no study addresses standard choice and
timing.
In the next section, I discuss the technologies, i.e., the choices that
governments faced, and characterize the environment in which these decisions were
reached. The data is presented and discussed in section three. Section four contains
the econometric analysis and section five the conclusions.
2. Mobile Telephony
Based on earlier radiotelephony technologies, analog standards for what is now called
mobile telephony began to emerge in the 1970’s.9 The  standard  describes  how  the
handset communicates with the network, and is a crucial ingredient to how the
network operates. Handsets designed for a particular standard do not operate within a
network  designed  for  another  standard.  The  first  countries  to  adopt  such  a  standard
were U.S. in 1977 and Japan in 1978. U.S. adopted the Advanced Mobile Phone
System (AMPS) standard, but diffusion of mobile phones was delayed until 1983
8 Several analyses exist that do not use econometrics: see e.g. Spiller and Cardilli (1997).
7because  of  regulatory  delays.  Thus  Japan  was  the  first  country  to  introduce  the  new
good. The adopted standard was developed in Japan, and the Japanese state telecoms
monopoly (NTT) retained rights over the standard. The Scandinavian countries
followed in the early 1980’s with a standard of their  own (NMT). The decision was
one clearly made by governments. International organizations such as International
Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee and International
Telecommunications Union do not have decision making powers. For example, (see
Funk and Methe, 2001), accounts exist that attribute France’s and Germany’s
relatively late adoption of any standard to politics (and lobbying). They were reluctant
to  adopt  the  Scandinavian  NMT  standard  as  they  wanted  a  standard  they,  and  their
domestic firms, could dominate. Initial efforts to adopt a common standard failed, and
France ended adopting its own standard (RC2000) in 1985. Germany adopted its own
standard (C-450), too, in 1985.
All in all, eight different analog standards have been adopted by 1998 by at
least one country. Other standards may have been considered, but were never adopted.
Of  these  eight  standards,  the  Scandinavian  NMT,  AMPS  and  TACS  dominate  with
adoption shares of 38, 38 and 13 per cent respectively. As in my data only a few
countries adopt any other standard than NMT, I concentrate on the timing aspect of
this decision.
No quantitative analysis of these decisions exists, and the qualitative analyses
all underline the political nature of the process. It is commonly argued that lobbying
for one or the other standard was sometimes pronounced. For example, Funk and
Methe (2001) mention that the “initial sponsors” for NMT were the four Scandinavian
PTTs; that of RC2000 France Telecom only, and so on. Nobody however mentions
9 Hausman (2002) offers a survey of mobile telephony.
8lobbying by consumer organizations. Discussions with technical experts suggest that
although there were technical differences between standards, these were not drastic
from consumers’ point of view. Also, it is probably fair to state that at the time when
decisions on standards (both analog and digital) were made, consumers were more or
less ignorant (indifferent) about the matter.
3. The Data
The key standards and other mobile telephony data come from EMC.10 The
country level economic and demographic variables come entirely from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators. Main (fixed) telephone line data is from the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) publications. The legal origin –
variables and latitude come from La Porta et al. (1997), the political rights and civil
rights data from Freedom House (2000), Henisz (2001) and Jaggers and Marshall
(2000).11 All other variables are standard; the Freedom House variables are on a seven
point Likert scale (1 = full rights, 7 = smallest possible rights); the political
constraints variable of Henisz is on a scale of 0-1 (1 = highest political constraints),
10 See http://www.emc-database.com/.
11 Political rights and civil rights are defined by Freedom House as follows
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm, accessed April 30th, 2004):
To answer the political rights questions, Freedom House considers to what extent the system offers
voters the opportunity to choose freely from among candidates and to what extent the candidates are
chosen independently of the state. However, formal electoral procedures are not the only factors that
determine the real distribution of power. In many countries, the military retains a significant political
role, while in others, the king maintains considerable power over the elected politicians.
In answering the civil liberties questions, Freedom House does not equate constitutional guarantees of
human rights with the on-the-ground fulfillment of these rights. For states and territories with small
populations, particularly tiny island nations, the absence of trade unions and other forms of association
is not necessarily viewed as a negative situation unless the government or other centers of domination
are deliberately blocking their establishment or operation.
For more information, see the above mentioned www-site.
9and the polity variable of Jaggers and Marshall is on a scale of -10 to 10 (-10 = worst
political rights, 10 = best political rights).12
The US patent data is from NBER (Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 2001). I first
computed the number of US patents per country in three patent categories: 178
(Telegraphy), 379 (Telephonic Communications), and 455 (Telecommunications),
assuming that all patents are held for their maximum number of years (20). I do not
discount patents by their age, the idea being that the patent stock is a measure of both
the amount of accumulated human capital in telecoms, and a measure of intellectual
property rights in possession. In addition to the patent count, I calculated averages for
two measures of the quality of the patent, both devised by Trajtenberg, Jaffe and
Henderson (1997): originality, and generality. Both are Herfindahl-type measures that
use citations. Originality uses citations made by a patent. Originality is increasing in
the number of patent fields to which citations are made. Generality uses citations
received by a patent, and is increasing in the number of fields from which a patents
receives citations. I use the values reported in the NBER data file, and calculate
averages for yearly country-level stocks of patents. I use two measures of human
capital/intellectual property rights in the analysis. First, a simple dummy for a country
having telecom patents; second, the direct (and, alternatively, quality weighted)
number of patents.  The quality weighted number of patents is defined as the number
of telecom patents times average originality times average generality.
Political and civil rights have been used in many macroeconomic studies (e.g.
Easterly and Levine, 1997, Rodrik, 2000).  These are known to be highly correlated
(correlation in the current sample 0.90, significant at 1% level), and I follow previous
studies in combining the two measures. Countries with highest rated political rights
12 In the estimation analysis, I transform these to be decreasing in political rights in order to produce
10
“come closest to the ideals suggested by the checklist questions, beginning with free
and fair elections. Those who are elected rule, there are competitive parties or other
political groupings, and the opposition plays an important role and has actual power.
Minority groups have reasonable self-government or can participate in the
government through informal consensus”
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm, accessed
May 20th, 2004). Countries  with  highest  civil  rights  “come  closest  to  the  ideals
expressed in the civil liberties checklist, including freedom of expression, assembly,
association, education, and religion. They are distinguished by an established and
generally equitable system of rule of law. Countries and territories with this rating
enjoy free economic activity and tend to strive for equality of opportunity (same
source as in the previous quotation). As alternative measures, I use Henisz’ (2001)
measure on constraints on executive power (see e.g. Djankov et al., 2002), and the
‘polity’ measure of Jaggers and Marshall (2000).  As shown by La Porta et al. (1999),
legal  origins  of  a  country  are  a  key  determinant  of  the  quality  of  government.  They
show that French legal origin countries have inferior government performance
compared to common law (English origin, but also German and Scandinavian origin)
countries.
The socio-economic data is from World Development Indicators, and includes
standard measures such as population, surface area, measures of age-structure, gdp
per capita, and others. I use ITU data on fixed line telephones.
The needed telecoms data is available for 207 countries but, as is to be
expected, I do not have all the other data for all the countries, or else (as in the case of
former Soviet Union republics and Eastern Europe) the political system during my
comparably signed coefficients with the base regression that uses the Freedom House measures.
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observation period meant that no decision was even contemplated. Concentrating on
the analog standard prior to the introduction of first digital (2G) standards in early
1991 and on those countries on which I have the needed data from the above sources
and which make a clear country-level decision leaves 85 countries, and a total of 842
country-year observations.
These are naturally very heterogenous with respect to demographics and
economic indicators, as the sample descriptive statistics in Table 1 reveal. Notice
especially that only slightly more than twenty per cent of my observations are ones
where the country in question had at least one U.S. telecom patent. The relatively high
mean  is  the  results  of  a  few  countries  (most  notably,  the  U.S.  and  the  UK)  having
large patent stocks. As will become clear below, this has an effect on estimation
results. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of my measures of political
institutions. On a scale from 1 (best) to 7 (worst), the average political and civil rights
are 4. The other measures of political rights are highly correlated with the Freedom
House measures.13 There is wide variation especially across countries, but in some
cases, also within countries. 60% of observations are from countries with French legal
origin, and only 1.2% from countries with German legal origin.
[TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE]
Of the 85 countries, 23 adopt an analog standard by end of my observation
period.14 Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics both for my sample, and the whole
world during the observation period. Only nine countries that adopted an analog
standard within the observation period are excluded; the number of countries that did
13 Correlation between the aggregated political rights and civil rights measure and the Henisz measure
of political constraints is -0.81; that between the first and the Jaggers and Marshall measure -0.51. Both
the Henisz and Jaggers and Marshall measures are increasing in political rights, the Freedom House
measure is decreasing in political rights.
14 The countries and their adoption dates, both within and after the observation period of this study, are
listed in the Appendix.
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not adopt but are excluded is naturally much higher. Of the 23 adopting countries in
the sample, 14 adopted the Nordic NMT standard, 4 the AMPS standard, and 5 each a
unique standard (e.g. France RC2000, Germany C-450 and so on). In addition to
NMT, Sweden adopted (simultaneously) a standard of its own (Comvik).15 Of the 85
countries, 66 adopted a 1G standard by end of 1998, and several of those that did not
adopt a 1G standard adopted a 2G standard by 1998 (e.g. Greece). Although it is clear
that the non-adopters are poor countries, being poor clearly does not directly imply
that no 1G standard was chosen, as many of those countries which (eventually) adopt
are poor (e.g. Papua New Guinea adopted AMPS in 1994). Also, some developing
countries were early adopters (e.g. Tunisia and Malaysia both adopted NMT in 1984).
In the empirical analysis, I define the year of actual adoption as the year prior
to the year in which EMC registers the first users. The idea is that an irreversible
decision is taken only at the point of building the network. Thus in the data, the U.S.
adoption date is coded as 1982, and that of France as 1984. I check the robustness of
my results to this definition by estimating a model where I use a two-year lag.
As can be seen from Table 3, the average adoption times are very similar for
the three possibilities (NMT, AMPS, other). Note that the number of users of mobile
phones of a given standard, and the number of potential users are both calculated
using world, not sample, figures.
[TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE]
 Table 4 reports the average adoption year conditional on having either below
or above median political and civil rights, and on legal origin, with some sample
descriptive statistics.16 Political and civil rights seem to have a large effect on
standard adoption: of those countries with median or below median rights, only 10%
15 Comvik never took off: in my sources (ITU, EMC), it is always reported to have zero adopters.
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adopt by 1987. The comparable figure for above median countries is 47%. The
difference in adoption times, conditional on adopting, is only one year (1983 vs.
1984). Countries with German legal origin are on average fastest to adoption
(conditional on adoption), closely followed by countries with Scandinavian legal
origin. All countries with Scandinavian and German legal origin also adopt a
standard; the proportion of English (French) legal origin countries adopting are 25.7%
(16.7%).  There  seems  to  be  a  clear  pattern  in  that  countries  with  Scandinavian  and
German legal origin adopt, and adopt early, relative to countries with other legal
origins.
As  is  clear  from this  description,  the  data  would  not  allow one  to  estimate  a
model where a distinction was made between different standards. I therefore
concentrate on estimating the decision to adopt a standard.17
4. Econometric Model and Results
A. The Model
I  aim  to  explain  the  determinants  of  the  timing  of  1G  standard  adoption.  A  natural
way  to  model  this  econometrically  is  to  use  a  hazard  model.  That  is,  I  study  what
determines the probability of adopting a 1G standard in country i in year t, given that
no standard has been adopted earlier in that country. I estimate discrete time hazard
models, and allow for a time-varying baseline hazard.18 In  these  models,  the  period
specific hazard rate takes the form
(1) )]exp(exp[1)( jitijj XXh gb +--= .
16 There are no countries with socialist legal origin in our data set.
17 One could build a structural dynamic discrete choice model; indeed, an earlier version of this paper
estimated such a model. Alternatively, one could estimate reduced form competing risk models.
Identification of standard specific effects in either case would  hinge on only a few (or just one) actual
choice. This was deemed unsatisfactory, and I therefore concentrate on the adoption decision of a
standard (versus not adopting a standard yet).
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Where )( ijj Xh  is the discrete time hazard in the jth time interval, itX  is a vector of
possibly time-varying covariates, b  is a vector of parameters that are to be estimated,
and ttlg d
j
j
a
a
j )(log
1
0ò
-
=  ( )(0 tl  = baseline hazard function) captures the period
specific effect on the hazard parametrically (and would in principle allow a non-
parametric baseline hazard; see fn. 21). The model thus allows to control for
unobservable cost and other changes over time. The associated log-likelihood function
takes the form
(2) )]}(1log[)1()(log{log
1 1
ijj
n
i
t
j
ijijjij XhyXhyL
i
åå
= =
--+=
where ijy  is an indicator taking value one if country i adopted a standard in period j,
and is zero otherwise. One can also add unobserved heterogeneity into the model.
I include five types of explanatory variables into the model: first, country (and
year) level demographics such as population, geographic area, and gdp per capita that
mainly control for benefits of mobile telephony. A country’s geography and
population may have affected the timing of standard choice: indeed, in the Nordic
countries, the decision to start to develop the NMT standard was at least partly based
on the objective of providing telephone services to the remote areas of these sparsely
populated countries; something which was deemed uneconomical using fixed lines.
Gdp per capita is a self-explanatory independent variable. I also include the number of
fixed line phones per 1000 inhabitants. I expect geography, population and gdp per
capita to have positive coefficients. The sign of the coefficient of fixed line phones is
hard to predict, as on the one hand, fixed line phones are a substitute to mobile
18 For details on the econometric model, see e.g. Jenkins (2004), especially chapters 6 and 9.
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phones, and on the other, the more there are fixed line phones, the larger are the direct
(within-country) network effects.19
Second, I include measures of the telecom human capital of the country, using the
above explained U.S.-patent based variables. These will capture both the costs of
building the network and providing the services, and the potential of a country’s firms
to capture a share of the global surplus. The idea behind the latter is that firms in more
technologically advanced countries will be able to go down the learning curve faster if
their home country adopts a standard early, and to then benefit from this when
competing in other markets (=countries) against firms from other countries. To allow
for a nonlinear effect, I include both the direct (potentially quality-weighted) patent
measure, and an indicator taking value one if a country has at least one telecoms
patent. If lobbying by local industry resulted in a delay of standard adoption, one
would expect a negatively signed coefficient for the telecom patent count.
Third, I include measures that aim to capture both the existing and future level of
the indirect network effects between countries. Indirect network effects are related to
costs of building the network, and providing the handsets and services. I include both
the number of existing users worldwide, and the population in the countries that by
end of the previous year had adopted a standard. The former measures the existing
size of the market, whereas the latter is a measure of the potential size of the market.
The former should obtain a positive coefficient, as it captures realized cost reductions.
The latter may obtain a negative coefficient, as it indicates a higher option value for
waiting. The idea is that a higher potential stock means that in the future, indirect
19Gruber and Verboven (2001a,b) include the fixed line stock as an explanatory variable into their
mobile phone diffusion equation. Liikanen, Stoneman and Toivanen (2004) study how fixed line
phones’ and 1G (2G) penetration rate affects the diffucsion of 2G (1G) phones. All three studies find
that fixed line phones are a substitute for mobile phones.
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network effect will be larger, and therefore, the cost of adopting lower. In measuring
these variables, I make no distinction between standards.
My fourth category of explanatory variables is the political economy ones. These
include latitude as a control; I expect it to get a positive sign as the early adopters
were all industrial countries. Further, I include the Freedom House measures of
combined political and civil rights, and the legal origin variables. The expectation is
that countries with better political rights have a higher hazard rate: given that the
Freedom House measures are decreasing in political rights, I thus expect a negative
coefficient. As it is known that Nordic countries adopted 1G standards early, I expect
the Scandinavian legal origin dummy to carry a positive coefficient, but would
hesitate to give it any political interpretation. The French legal origin dummy however
may obtain a negative coefficient, given that earlier research has documented that
French legal origin is associated with inferior government performance.
The fifth category is interactions between the political economy and network and
technical variables. Democracies may put more weight on costs of adoption. If
domestic human capital decreases costs, one would expect a negative coefficient for
the interaction between political and civil rights, and the number of telecom patents as
better democracies give more weight to lower costs of adoption. On the other hand, if
the number of domestically owned U.S. telecom patents measures the incentive of the
domestic telecom industry to lobby for a particular standard (as seems to have been
the case in France and Germany, for example), one might expect a positive coefficient
if lobbying leads to a delay in decision making. One would expect that more
democratic governments are less likely to be affected by such lobbying, and therefore
should not be delayed in their decision making to the same extent as less democratic
countries. I would expect that countries with better political rights take both realized
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and potential indirect network effects better into account: i.e., that countries with
better political rights increase their adoption probability more when there is an
increase in the world-wide number of current users, and delay more when there is an
increase in the world-wide number of potential future users.
B. Estimation Results
Estimation results are presented in Table 5. Column (1) displays the main equation,
estimated allowing for a time-dependent (Weibull) hazard. Looking first at socio-
economic controls for benefits of mobile telephony, we find that gdp per capita has a
positive, but decreasing effect on the hazard of adopting a 1G standard; population
has  a  positive  effect,  too.  Fixed  line  penetration  has  a  positive  effect  on  the  hazard.
This means that the direct network effects generated by a larger number of fixed line
phones outweigh any substitution effects (which have been reported by Gruber and
Verboven, 2001a,b, and Liikanen, Stoneman and Toivanen, 2004) between mobile
and fixed phones regarding the timing of standard choice.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
On the cost side, the measures of indirect network effects seem to work as
expected: the world stock of actual adopters increases the hazard, while the number of
potential users decreases it. The former captures indirect network effects, i.e., the
costs of building a network, and of acquiring handsets. The larger the installed base,
the further down the learning curve the industry has reached, resulting in lower costs.
The logic behind the latter result is that a larger potential market (conditional on the
size of the actual market) means that indirect network effects will likely grow fast.
This is turn means that a delay, though costly in terms of foregone consumer surplus,
also means potential cost savings in implementing the standard.
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 The indicator variable for a country having at least one telecom patent has a
large  positive  coefficient.  This  means  that  countries  with  at  least  some  domestic
human capital in telecoms (R&D) have a higher hazard rate of adoption than countries
without any, ceteris paribus. Contrasting this result, the coefficient on the number of
patents is negative and significant. This means that conditional on having at least
some patents, the higher the level of human capital in telecom R&D, the less likely a
country is to adopt. This could be an indication of the kind of explanations put
forward  in  qualitative  research.  Countries  with  relatively  high  amounts  of  telecoms
human capital, such as France, the UK, and Germany, were late to adopt as they tried
(unsuccessfully, in these cases) to convince other countries to adopt their standard.
Importantly, this result (see columns (5) and (6)) is not robust to excluding the U.S.
and  the  UK,  countries  that  are  clear  outliers  regarding  the  patent  stock  variable.  I
therefore view this evidence as weak. For the mean of the patent variable, when
excluding those two countries, the aggregate effect of these two human capital
variables is large and positive.
 Turning to the political economy variables, we find that only the Scandinavian
legal origin dummy carries a significant (positive) coefficient. This was expected as
all the Scandinavian countries adopted a 1G standard early on. I would however
hesitate to give this coefficient a political interpretation, given these countries’
demonstrated high preference for mobile communications from late 60’s onwards.
The direct effect of political and civil rights is insignificant but positive, indicating
that worse political rights would lead to a higher hazard rate. However, one cannot
interpret the direct effect alone as the interaction effects have to be taken into account.
At the means of the other variables, the effect of increasing political and civil rights is
to decrease the hazard rate. This is however largely driven by the positive and
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significant coefficient of the interaction with the number of patents. Keeping all other
interaction variables at their sample means, a patent count of six or more yields a
positive effect on the hazard (meaning that worse political rights lead to a higher
hazard rate of adoption). However, only 10% of the sample’s country-year
observations have six or more US telecom patents, and this effect is again not robust
to excluding the US and UK (see column (6)).20 The sample mean of the patent count
for other countries than the U.S. and the UK is two. Ignoring the insignificant
coefficients (the linear political and civil rights coefficient, and the interaction with
the world potential stock of adopters) yields a patent threshold of 44. Thus, even with
the results in column (1), the effect of increased political and civil rights is to increase
the hazard rate of standard adoption for the majority of observations and countries. To
quantify the effects of political institutions I calculated the effect of changing the
political and civil rights from their mean values to their minimum (best) values while
keeping other variables at their sample means, and the patent count at five (the 90th
percentile). The effect of this experiment is to increase the hazard rate by 5%.
The  interactions  of  political  and  civil  rights  with  other  variables  produce
interesting results by themselves. The interactions between the French legal origin
dummy and the patent count variable carries a negative and significant coefficient,
reinforcing the interpretation given above for the patent count coefficient. La Porta et
al. (1999) have shown that French legal origin correlates strongly (and negatively)
with  political  rights:  the  effect  in  our  data  is  strong  enough  to  overcome  that
correlation. The interaction between political and civil rights, and the patent dummy
obtains a negative and significant coefficient. This means that the higher the political
rights (the lower the Freedom House measure), the larger is the positive effect of
20 Countries with at least 6 U.S. telecom patents are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium (max. 6
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having at least some telecom human capital on the hazard rate of adoption. As with
the direct measures, the interaction with the patent count carries a positive coefficient.
Its interpretation is that the worse are political and civil rights, the bigger the decrease
in hazard rate induced by having telecom human capital. This is consistent with the
French legal dummy-patent count interaction’s coefficient, and the interpretation that
in countries with less well performing governments, the stronger the domestic telecom
lobby, the lower the adoption hazard. However, as results reported in columns (5) and
(6) demonstrate, this result is strongly dependent on having both the UK and the U.S.
in  the  sample  and  this  result  is  therefore  as  weak  as  that  on  the  direct  effect  of  the
patent stock. Finally, the interactions between political and civil rights and the indirect
network variables (only the one with the actual stock of users is significant – at 7%
level)  suggest  that  countries  with  better  political  rights  take  indirect  network  effects
more into account..
Finally, I find positive duration dependence, i.e., the hazard rate of adoption
increases over time, even after conditioning on the covariates. I also attempted to
estimate the model using a fully flexible baseline hazard. This turned out not to be
possible, as a necessary condition for this is that for each year, there is at least one
realization of the hazard (i.e., a country adopts a standard). This is not the case with
the current data.21
In column (2), the patent count is replaced by a quality weighted patent count. The
results  are  well  in  line  with  those  in  column  (1).  In  columns  (3)  and  (4)  the  main
measure of political rights is replaced by Henisz’ and Jaggers’ and Marshall’s
measures. I rescaled their measures to be decreasing in political rights so as to be in
patents), Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway (6), Sweden, UK and U.S., representing
15% of all countries (13 out of 85) in the sample.
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line with the Freedom House measures.22 While some coefficients do not retain their
significance (foremost the stock and potential stock of adopters), the political
economy results are robust to this change in measurement. The exception is the
interaction with world stock of adopters, the coefficient of which is not significant in
columns (3) and (4). In column (5) the U.S. is excluded, and in column (6) both the
U.S.  and  the  UK.  The  reason  for  this  robustness  test  is  that  these  countries,  and  the
U.S. in particular, are clear outliers regarding the patent count(s). One would expect
that excluding them would weaken the results on the patent count variable and its
interactions. That indeed happens: the direct patent count variable coefficient isn’t
significant anymore, and the coefficient of the interaction between political and civil
rights and the patent count remains significant (and does not drop in absolute value)
only if at least the UK is included in the sample. At the means of other variables, the
effect of an increase in political and civil rights (a decrease in the value of that
variable) is to increase the hazard rate of adoption. Otherwise, the results are very
close  to  those  in  column  (1).  As  a  final  robustness  check,  I  experimented  with
changing the assumption of a one-year lag between the de facto decision on a standard
and  its  implementation  (measured  as  the  first  year  with  mobile  phones  in  use)  to  a
two-year lag. The results remain qualitatively identical to those in column (1), with all
the same coefficients being statistically significant.
As an additional robustness check, I also estimated models that control for
unobserved heterogeneity using random effects. These essentially reproduced the
reported results, and the Null of no unobserved heterogeneity could never be rejected.
21 To implement the non-parametric baseline hazard would have necessitated the pooling of three
consecutive periods’ indicators, meaning that within each such (somewhat arbitrary) three–year
interval, the hazard would have been assumed constant.
22 This was done by multiplying Henisz’ measure by -10, and by multiplying Jaggers’ and Marshall’s
measure by -1. There is a slight reduction in sample size as neither measure is available for all sample
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 Summing  up,  the  robust  results  of  the  above  analysis  are  that  i)  larger  and
richer countries have a higher hazard rate of adopting a standard; ii) existence of
telecom human capital increases the hazard; iii) increases in the world stock of users
decreases, increases in the world stock of potential users increases the hazard; iv)
democracies put more weight on telecom human capital and world stock of adopters,
and v) French legal origin countries put less weight on telecom human capital than
countries of other legal origins. Other robust findings are that the hazard is increasing
over time, most likely reflecting decreased (quality-adjusted) costs of building a
network, and that Scandinavian legal origin countries have a higher hazard rate of
adoption, most likely reflecting more their preferences than differences in
governmental decision making processes.
5. Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to study standard decisions empirically: to the
best of my knowledge, despite the acknowledged importance of standard decisions in
industries with network effects, actual standard decisions have not been studied
quantitatively using international country level data (but see Simcoe 2003 for an
empirical study of Internet Engineering Task Force). I chose to study 1G standard
decisions as this has been highlighted (Hausman, 1997, 2002) as an example where
regulatory indecision lead to large welfare losses, and because it displays several
attractive features: a well defined and internationally comparable decision, clear
decision making authority (governments), little or no (achieved) coordination between
decision makers, and large variation in outcomes.
countries. I have checked the results on the reduced samples using the Freedom House measures of
political and civil rights, and they are in line with those reported in column (1).
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Richer and more populous countries adopt earlier, as was expected. The results
show  that  countries  with  some  telecom  human  capital  adopt  a  standard  earlier.
Countries did take indirect network effects into account: the larger the potential stock
of adopters, the lower the hazard. This indicates that countries chose to trade off
(current) consumer surplus with future lower prices induced by indirect network
effects. Also, the larger the current world stock of adopters, the higher the hazard. A
higher stock measures the degree to which the industry has moved down the learning
curve, and thus lowered the costs of both building and operating a network, and
producing handsets. Thus it seems countries did react to costs of building a network.
It turned out that political variables do exert a systematic, statistically robust influence
on standard adoption: countries with better political rights increased their hazard more
in response to there being at least some telecom human capital in the country; and
countries with better political rights put more weight on indirect network effects.
Scandinavian legal origin countries had a higher hazard rate than English legal origin
countries, although this probably cannot be attributed to politics but to a government
preference for mobile telephony; and countries with French legal origin decreased
their hazard rate more in response to an increase in the amount of domestic human
capital in telecoms. The latter result was interpreted as less successful lobbying by
domestic industry in countries with better political rights. The results in sum suggest
that more democratic governments reacted more forcefully to current and future costs
and benefits.
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Table 1
Sample Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean (s.d.)
Population
(Millions)
28.500
(85.200)
Proportion of 15-65 year olds 0.424
(1.550)
GDP/Capita
(1000 USD/year PPP)
3271.502
(3188.014)
Surface Area 91.620
(179.856)
Main Telephone Lines/ 1000 72.547
(120.545)
World Stock of Adopters 421682
(799483)
Latitude .233
(.167)
World Stock of Potential Adopters 3.79E8
(5.82E8)
Telpat. Indicator variable taking value one for a
country having US telecom patents, zero
otherwise.
0.218
(0.413)
Number of US telecom patents registered in
country i in year t.
66.646
(588.845)
Quality weighted number of US telecom patents
Defined as # pat x avg. originality x avg.
generality x 100000
77.400
(780.066)
NOTES: there are 85 countries and 842 country-year observations in the data. Data from World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (Population, GDP/Capita, Proportion of 15-65 year olds, surface area),
ITU publications (Main telephone lines), EMC (world stock and potential stock of adopters) and NBER
(telpat, wpat).
Table 2
Institutional Environment of Government
Variable Mean (s.d.).
Political Rights 3.988
(2.123)
Civil Rights 4.017
(1.854)
Political and Civil Rights 8.006
(3.874)
Political Constraints 0.162
(0.213)
Polity -2.539
(15.585)
English legal origin 0.342
(0.475)
French legal origin 0.601
(0.490)
German legal origin 0.012
(0.107)
Scand. legal origin 0.033
(0.180)
NOTES: Political Rights and Civil Rights data from Freedom House (2000); Legal origin data from La
Porta et al. (1997); Political constraints from Henisz (2001); Polity from Jaggers and Marshall (2000).
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Standard Adoption and Within Standard Diffusion
Standard NMT AMPS Other
Number of countries
adopting
by end of 1987 in
sample
(world)
14
(22)
3
(6)
6
(9)
Average year of
adoption in sample
(world) during sample
period
1983.643
(1983.647)
1985.333
(1983.833)
1983
(1983.444)
First/last adoption
within sample (world)
during sample period
1981/1986
(1981/1986)
1984/1986
(1983/1986)
1978/1985
(1978/1985)
Stock of adopters in
world (s.d.). Defined as
worldwide number of
mobile phone
connections  (millions)
using standard h in
period t-1 .
4.738
(15.613)
19.369
(63.958)
0.160
(0.396)
# Potential adopters in
world (s.d.). Defined as
population (millions) in
countries that have
adopted standard h by
t-1.
49.700
(99.159)
110.836
(133.030)
241.984
(438.032)
NOTES: Adoption year is defined as the year with the first recorded mobile phone users in country i-1.
The difference between the sample and year average adoption times, and the first adoption year for
AMPS are explained by Brunei which is excluded from the sample, and adopted AMPS in 1979.
Table 4
Standard Adoption and Political and Civil Rights, and Legal Origin
1977-1987
Political and Civil Rights
in 1977
 Legal Origin
Variable Above
Median
Median or
below
English French German Scand.
# countries 38 48 29 50 2 5
Prop. of obs. (%) - - 34.2 60.1 1.1 3.3
Avg. year of
adoption
conditional on
adopting by 1987
1983.5 1984.8 1984.6 1984.9 1981.0 1981.8
# Countries
adopting by 1987
(Probability of
adopting by
1987)
19
(.47)
4
(.10)
8
(.29)
8
(.16)
2
(1.00)
5
(1.00)
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Table 5
Determinants of the Timing of Standard Adoption
Variable (1)
Baseline
Specification
(2)
Using Quality
Weighted
Patents
(3)
Using
Political
Constraints
(4)
Using Polity
(5)
Excluding
USA
(6)
Excluding
USA and UK
(7)
Two Year
Lag
Geographic Area -.820
   (1.375)
-.925
(1.380)
-.348
(1.243)
-.4005814
(1.432)
-.964
  (1.463)
-5.760**
(2.451)
-.820
(1.375)
Population 00007**
(.00003)
.00007**
(.00003)
.00004**
(.00001)
.00009***
(.00003)
.00006
(.00004)
.00009**
(.00004)
.00007**
(.00003)
Population
Squared
-2.15e-07
(1.97e-07)
-2.19e-07
(2.06e-07)
-6.34e-08
(5.49e-08)
-3.31e-07*
(1.97e-07)
-1.31e-07
(2.20e-07)
-3.13e-07
(2.24e-07)
-2.15e-07
(1.97e-07)
Proportion of 15-
65 Year Olds
.0002
  (.0004)
.0002
(.0005)
.0001
(.0004)
.0003
(.0003)
.0002
(.0004)
-.0008
(.002)
.0002
(.0004)
Gdpcap .928***
  (.367)
.863***
(.348)
.831**
(.418)
.972**
(.416)
.878**
  (.367)
1.219***
   (.452)
.928***
(.367)
Gdpcap Squared -.058**
   (.026)
-.057**
(.026)
-.056**
(.026)
-.046
   (.034)
-.052**
  (.027)
-.071**
   (.033)
-.058**
(.026)
World Potential
Stock
-.0009*
(.0005)
-.0012*
(.0006)
-.0008
(.0006)
-.0010
(.0008)
-.0011**
 (.0005)
-.0011**
(.0006)
-.0009*
(.0005)
World Stock .445**
   (.196)
.481**
(.218)
.024
   (.210)
.229
    (.232)
.582***
  (.233)
.553**
   (.247)
.445**
(.196)
Fixed Phones .010*
   (.006)
.011*
 (.006)
.002
   (.006)
.008
   (.009)
.008
   (.006)
.011
  (.008)
.010*
  (.006)
Telecom Patents -.036***
  (.013)
-0.383***
(0.132)
-.039***
(.012)
-.060***
(.023)
-.025
 (.019)
.012
   (.025)
-.036***
(.013)
Telecom Patent
Indicator
8.205***
  (2.864)
8.079***
(2.878)
7.041**
(2.902)
4.400
(3.251)
7.621***
(2.867)
8.797***
   (3.298)
8.205***
(2.864)
Latitude 2.283
   (2.834)
1.860
(2.832)
2.447
(2.703)
2.117
(3.173)
2.800
   (2.914)
-4.773
(4.053)
2.283
  (2.835)
Political and Civil
Rights
.506
  (.325)
.458
   (.363)
.263
  (.431)
.290
   (.432)
.472
 (.337)
.483
  (.366)
.506
   (.325)
French Legal
Origin
.331
  (.910)
.114
    (.882)
-.383
    (.74)
.713
   (.833)
.312
  (.915)
-.273
  (.947)
.331
   (.910)
German 2.315
   (1.646)
1.943
(1.741)
1.230
(1.256)
3.498*
(2.053)
2.744
 (1.850)
1.866
   (2.017)
2.315
(1.646)
Scandinavian 5.111***
   (1.874)
5.543***
(1.907)
3.647**
(1.616)
11.208***
(3.819)
5.160***
  (1.993)
7.197***
(2.337)
5.111***
(1.874)
French*Patents -.014**
(.007)
-0.168**
(0.875)
-.011*
(.007)
-.025***
(.010)
-.011
  (.008)
-.020**
   (.010)
-.014**
(.007)
Scand*Patents -.016
   (.017)
-4.869
(6.194)
.004
   (.017)
-.031
   (.025)
-.015
  (.017)
-.039*
  (.023)
-.016
   (.017)
Pol&Civ*Patents .018***
   (.006)
0.192***
(0.656)
.019***
(.006)
.030***
(.011)
.014*
 (.008)
.003
   (.010)
.018***
(.006)
Pol&Civ*Patent
Indicator
-2.577***
(1.034)
-2.317**
(.956)
-2.638**
(1.144)
-2.156**
(1.113)
-2.410**
  (1.038)
-2.395**
  (1.071)
-2.577***
(1.034)
Pol&Civ*World
Stock
-.055*
   (.030)
-.061*
(.033)
-.031
   (.046)
-.040
   (.035)
-.067**
  (.032)
-.067**
   (.035)
-.055*
(.030)
Pol&Civ*Potential
Stock
.00005
(.00007)
.00007
(.00008)
-.0004
(.0001)
.00004
(.00009)
.00007
(.00007)
.00007
(.00008)
.00005
(.00007)
Log(Time) 12.882***
(3.659)
17.053***
(4.908)
12.367***
(3.538)
20.795***
(7.277)
12.871***
(3.922)
15.720***
(4.691)
12.882***
(3.659)
Constant -38.053***
(7.860)
-45.036***
(9.566)
-29.039***
(6.756)
-51.905***
(14.074)
-37.347***
(7.965)
-41.852***
(9.880)
-38.053***
(7.860)
Nobs. 870 870 837 839 863 855 784
LogL. -41.931 -38.513 -45.383 -34.155 -39.937 -35.142 -41.931
LR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NOTES: Number presented are coefficient and (standard error). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at  10, 5 and 1% level.
LR = p-value of a likelihood ratio test of the joint significance of all explanatory variables.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix, I list the countries in the data set, and present details on which countries adopted or didn’t adopt a 1G standard and when they did so.
Table A.1
Standard Choice and Timing for Countries that Adopt within the Observation Period
Country Year NMT AMPS TACS C-450 Comvik NTT RTMS RC2000 all standards
Japan 1981 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Denmark 1981 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Finland 1981 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Norway 1981 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sweden 1981 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
United States 1982 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Austria 1984 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Canada 1984 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
France 1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Italy 1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Malaysia 1984 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Netherlands 1984 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Saudi Arabia 1984 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Tunisia 1984 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
United Kingdom 1984 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Iceland 1985 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
South Africa 1985 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Thailand 1985 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Turkey 1985 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Australia 1986 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Belgium 1986 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Indonesia 1986 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
New Zealand 1986 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
NOTES: Countries are listed in order of adoption. The adoption year is the year prior to first registration of users as listed in the EMC database.
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Table A.2
Standard Choice and Timing for Countries that Adopt after the Observation Period
Country Year NMT AMPS TACS C-450 Comvik NTT RTMS RC2000
Bahrain 1987 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Congo 1987 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dominican Republic 1987 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Morocco 1987 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Venezuela 1987 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile 1988 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Costa Rica 1988 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus 1988 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gabon 1988 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mauritius 1988 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico 1988 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sri Lanka 1988 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Algeria 1989 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guatemala 1989 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta 1989 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Pakistan 1989 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Peru 1989 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Philippines 1989 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil 1990 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jamaica 1990 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uruguay 1990 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Argentina 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bangladesh 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ecuador 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
El Salvador 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghana 1991 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Guyana 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kenya 1991 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Paraguay 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Colombia 1993 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 1993 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Benin 1994 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Burundi 1994 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gambia 1994 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Papua New Guinea 1994 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Senegal 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Central African Republic 1995 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Honduras 1995 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Madagascar 1995 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zambia 1995 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mali 1996 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Niger 1996 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table A.3
Non-Adopting Countries
country
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Egypt
Fiji
Greece
India
Iran
Jordan
Malawi
Mauritania
Mozambique
Nicaragua
Panama
Seychelles
Sudan
Swaziland
Togo
Zaire
